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Abstract
In this paper, I propose a novel way to model sentiments in asset prices. Under this
new representation, sentiments, or animal spirits, are sparked by exogenous shocks to
beliefs, but feed on the uncertainty generated by imperfect information. Sentiments
cause expectations to deviate from optimal, information-based estimates of fundamen-
tal values and their magnitude depends on the amount of uncertainty in such estimates.
The higher the uncertainty, the larger the scope for psychological attitudes to a¤ect
expectations.
Armed with this framework, I investigate the role of uncertainty on the transmission
channel from sentiment shocks to prices in a market with imperfect information and
Bayesian agents. The main result that emerges is that the source of noise generating
uncertainty, whether fundamental or informational shocks, has important consequences
for the e¤ect of sentiments. Specically, while more informational noise always amplies
the impact of psychological shocks on prices, more fundamental noise can actually
reduce such impact, depending on the elasticity of sentiments to uncertainty. This
result implies that, for example, noise traders in stock markets can actually reduce the
relevance of animal spirits for asset prices.
Key words: information; uncertainty; sentiments; Bayesian learning; nancial mar-
kets.
JEL classication: D83; D84; G14.
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1 Introduction
The impact of agents psychological attitudes, or sentiments, on economic outcomes has
long attracted the interest of economists. Notable early contributions recognizing the role
played by sentiments in determining economic activity are [Pigou (1927)], who discussed
psychological causes of industrial uctuations, and [Keynes (1936)], who famously coined
the term "animal spirits" to describe the impact of emotions and "a spontaneous urge to
action" on the economic actions of agents.
While these early works lacked formal rigor, more recent contributions have tried to make
more precise the exact nature of sentiments and the transmission mechanism from them to
economic outcomes. One approach put forward is to model sentiments as shocks to higher
order beliefs, i.e., beliefs about other agents beliefs, as done in [Angeletos and LaO (2009)]
and [Angeletos et al (2018)]. Alternatively, sentiments could be considered as a primitive of
a model, as proposed by [Farmer (2012)], who uses animal spirits, in the form of arbitrary
beliefs, to select among multiple equilibria in the market. From an empirical perspective,
sentiments have been captured as exogenous shocks to expectations, as in [Milani (2011)]
and [Milani (2017)].
In this paper, instead, I suggest that sentiments should be linked to the amount of
uncertainty in the economy, as specied by the relevant information structure. Under this
novel way to model, and understand, sentiments, animal spirits feed on the uncertainty
that derives from the imperfect information of agents when forecasting relevant variables.
Without uncertainty, there could be no sentiments, and the greater is the uncertainty, the
larger is the scope for agents psychological attitudes to impact on their expectations.
With perfect information and no uncertainty, consumers could not over- or under-estimate
their future consumption, investors could not be pessimistic or optimistic about future prof-
its conditions and workers and unions could not possibly misjudge future labour market
conditions. It is the uncertainty arising from imperfect information that opens the door
to subjective beliefs, and the larger the uncertainty, the more scope there is for stronger
psychological attitudes (both positive and negative).
In terms of nancial markets, the focus of this paper, if traders had complete information
and knew exactly the fundamental value of an asset, that is, the stream of cash ows that it
entitles to, there could be no psychological attitudes a¤ecting beliefs about its value: no-one
1
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could be optimistic or pessimistic about something it is known for sure. Animal spirits in
nancial market are made possible by the uncertainty surrounding the estimated value of an
asset, which allows agents to include subjective elements in their beliefs.
Building on these simple considerations, I model sentiments as a combination of an ex-
ogenous shock to beliefs, something similar to a sunspot, and uncertainty. It is uncertainty
that allows exogenous psychological shocks to a¤ect beliefs, and through them, prices. For-
malizing a link between uncertainty, due to imperfect (or noisy) information, and sentiments,
makes it possible to derive implications for the impact of psychological attitudes on asset
prices in relation to di¤erent sources of noise in the market.
In order to model uncertainty, I draw on the literature about noisy rational expectations
equilibria, in particular on the early works by [Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)], [Hellwig (1980)]
and [Diamond and Verrecchia (1981)], extending that class of models to include sentiments.
Agents use the information they have e¢ciently, as Bayesian learners, but include in their
beliefs an "animal spirits" component. The larger is the uncertainty around the value of
the asset, the more scope there is for psychological attitudes to a¤ect beliefs. Establishing a
formal link between uncertainty and sentiments allows then for an investigation of the prop-
agation mechanism from sentiments to prices, in relation to di¤erent sources of uncertainty.
The idea that imperfect information can lead to sentiments is not new. For example,
[Benhabib et al (2015)] propose a model where imperfect information in forecasting demand
by rms means that consumer sentiments can matter in determining equilibrium aggregate
supply. The new contribution of this paper, though, is to lay out and investigate the rela-
tionship between sentiments and the structure of information, in particular with respect to
the source of noise on the market.
The main question this paper addresses then is the following: given the assumed ampli-
ed role of uncertainty on sentiments, would an increase in noise always increase the impact
of psychological attitudes on prices? The surprising answer is that no, increased uncertainty
does not necessarily lead to a greater impact of sentiments on prices. In particular, infor-
mational and non-informational noise impacts di¤erently on the transmission channel from
sentiment shocks to prices: while more informational noise always amplies psychological
shocks, and thus increases the volatility of prices due to sentiments, more fundamental noise
can actually reduce the impact of psychological shocks on prices, depending on the elasticity
of sentiments to uncertainty.
The elasticity of sentiments to uncertainty is crucial in shaping the response of prices
to psychological shocks, as it interacts with the relative weights agents put on di¤erent
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sources of information under Bayesian updating. Sentiments enter prices through beliefs, and
prices enter beliefs as a source of information: the equilibrium relationship between prices
and sentiments depends on the amplication mechanism of psychological shocks through
uncertainty.
An increase in non-informational, or fundamental, noise reduces the precision of prices
as signals relative to that of exogenous information, thus decreasing the Bayesian weight on
prices. An elasticity of sentiments to uncertainty smaller than one means that sentiments
respond less than proportionally to increases in noise so in this case the reduced weight
on prices in the signal extraction process more than compensates for the amplication of
sentiments through increased uncertainty: the net e¤ect is a dampened response of prices to
sentiments.
With informational noise, instead, the weight on prices increases relative to the weight on
exogenous information when noise increases; at the same time, overall uncertainty increases,
so both e¤ects lead to a stronger e¤ect of psychological shocks on prices, irrespective of the
elasticity of sentiments to uncertainty.
These results are important in understanding the possible impact of sentiments on asset
prices, as they highlight the role of uncertainty as a mediating factor. They also provide
a useful framework for empirical work aiming at identifying sentiments in observed stock
prices, establishing formal links between variations in the amount of noise on the market from
di¤erent sources and the impact of sentiments, which could be exploited for identication
purposes.
2 Asset prices with sentiments
A one period risky asset is traded on the market and pays an unknown xed dividend  at
liquidation.
Agents receive private noisy information about such dividend, in the form of the signal
xi =  + vi;
where the noise in private information vi  N(0; 2v). I will refer to v
i as informational noise,
as it represents solely the accuracy of agents exogenous signal.
Agents form beliefs about the dividend using such exogenous information and prices,
optimally weighted using Bayesian theory. Prices are useful here as a source of information
for the dividend because of imperfect private information, as they reect the information of
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other traders.
The key assumption of this paper is that agents beliefs about the dividend are also
a¤ected by a sentiment component, to be specied below.
Agents are assumed to be risk neutral.1 Given individual agents beliefs (denoted by ^
i
),
and assuming no discount within period, prices are thus determined by the noisy equilibrium
condition
p =
Z i
^
i
di+ ": (1)
The stochastic term "  N(0; 2") prevents prices from being fully revealing, and could be
thought of as a shock in the exogenous supply of shares. It is sometimes justied in terms
of noise traders, agents whose demand is purely random and unrelated to any source of
information in the model. It is a source of uncertainty which I will refer to as fundamental,
or non-informational, noise: while it a¤ects the accuracy of the endogenous information, its
nature does not depend on the informational structure assumed in the market and it derives
instead from fundamental elements.
Beliefs are formed according to
^
i
= ^
i
I + S (2)
^
i
I = x
i + (1  ) p; (3)
where S represents the sentiments component in beliefs, in addition to the rational, information-
based element ^
i
I derived through Bayesian theory.
The parameter , which represents the optimal Bayesian weight on private versus public
information, is given by the relative precision of the two signals:
 =
2p
2v + 
2
p
: (4)
The level of uncertainty in information, denoted 2I , is measured by the variance of agents
information-based estimates of the fundamental:
2I  V ar

^
i
I

= 22v + (1  )
2 2p: (5)
1In the Appendix, I derive prices with risk averse agents: it can be seen that the sunspot component in
the price equation has the same form as the one derived under risk averse agents, so all results in this paper
carry through to a market with risk averse traders.
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Combining (4) and (5) leads to
2I =
2p
2
v
2v + 
2
p
= 2v: (6)
In order to capture the amplifying e¤ect of uncertainty on sentiments, I model sentiments
as a combination of uncertainty and psychological attitudes, taken as exogenous. I thus posit
S = h
 
2I ; s

; (7)
where s is a zero mean sentiments shock, with s  N(0; 2s). Positive values of s could be
interpreted as optimism, as they make beliefs of the value of the asset higher than their
information-based valuation (that is, its fundamental value, as far as agents can establish
given the information available in the market); negative values of s would instead capture
pessimism among agents. S thus represents uncertainty-amplied sentiments, which modify
the information-based element of expectations to determine agents beliefs. The assumption
that E(s) = 0 ensures that sentiments do not introduce any systematic bias in prices, so it
is optimal for agents to use prices, together with private exogenous information, in deriving
the fundamental.
One would expect the function h to satisfy the following restrictions: h
0
s > 0; h
0
2
I
> 0,
meaning that both higher uncertainty and larger psychological shocks (levels of optimism or
pessimism) lead to larger sentiments. Specically, I assume the following exible form for
the function h, parameterized by  > 0:
h
 
2I ; s

=
 
2I

s: (8)
The parameter  measures the elasticity of sentiments to uncertainty, dS
d2
I
2
I
S
, allowing for
di¤erent degrees of responsiveness. If  = 0, sentiments are una¤ected by uncertainty, so
they reduce down to an exogenous shock to beliefs. For  > 0, instead, sentiments grow with
uncertainty: if  < 1, such growth is less than proportional, limiting the impact of exogenous
psychological shocks on beliefs; if  > 1, instead, sentiments grow more than proportionately
with uncertainty and even a small amount of optimism can potentially have a large impact
on beliefs if uncertainty is high. Fig. (1) provides a visual representation of the relationship
between sentiments and uncertainty for three di¤erent levels of : 0:5, 1 and 1:5. Values of 
between 0 and 1 would seem most reasonable, though values of 1 or above could characterize
episodes of heightened animal spirits in the market. I remain agnostic in this work about
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Figure 1: Amplication of sentiments with uncertainty. Figure drawn for a positive unitary
s shock.
appropriate values for  and instead focus on deriving the implications of di¤erent values for
the impact of sentiments on prices.
Starting from (1) and using (2), (3), (7) and (8) leads to the price equation
p =  +  1"+  1
 
2I

s: (9)
Substituting (4) and (5) into it, gives
p =  +
2v + 
2
p
2p
"+

2p
2v + 
2
p
 1  
2v

s; (10)
from which one can derive an implicit equation for the price variance
2p =

2v + 
2
p
2p
2
2" +

2p
2v + 
2
p
2( 1)  
2v
2
2s: (11)
While it is not possible in general to solve analytically for 2p as a function of the exogenous
parameters of the model, 2v; 
2
"; 
2
s and , one can use the implicit function theorem to derive
some properties of prices and their variance. Of course, one can also solve for 2p numerically.
It can be shown that, for  = 1, the discriminant of the ensuing third order polynomial is
always negative, for any parameterization of 2v; 
2
"; 
2
s and , which means that there is
always only one real root. I will use such root as initial condition in the search routine for
nding a positive real root when  6= 1.
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3 Uncertainty and sentiments
The main aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between uncertainty and sentiments,
and how they interplay. In particular, I am interested in analyzing the e¤ect of sentiments
on prices and how it varies with changes in the amount of uncertainty in the market.
Uncertainty in this model comes from two sources. The rst is the aggregate shock ",
which a¤ects prices directly. It can be interpreted as an exogenous shock to the supply
of shares, for example because of noise traders. Even though this shock has informational
consequences, since it a¤ects the precision of the endogenous information in prices, I refer
to it as a fundamental, or non-informational shock, as it originates from real sources rather
than representing pure noise in information. The second type of shocks, v, is instead a purely
informational shock, as it represents noise in private exogenous information.
I start by dening the transmission channel from sentiments shocks to prices as
 
dp
ds
=  1
 
2v

: (12)
I am thus interested in how such channel varies with changes in the amount of uncertainty
on the market. Specically
d
d2"
= (   1) 2
 
2v
 d
d2"
(13)
captures how the sentiments channel varies with the amount of non-informational, or funda-
mental, noise; and
d
d2v
= (   1) 2
 
2v
 d
d2v
+  1
 
2v
 1
(14)
captures how the sentiments channel varies with the amount of informational noise.
3.1 A special case
In the special case where the elasticity of sentiments to uncertainty is equal to one, that is
 = 1, it is straightforward to establish that d
d2"
= 0 and d
d2v
> 0, since  = 2v. In this
case, thus:
1. Changes in uncertainty from fundamental, or non-informational, noise a¤ect prices
directly but do not a¤ect the sentiments channel. This result is due to the fact that,
as the variance of prices increases (and thus the overall uncertainty 2I , since
2
I
2p
> 0),
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agents put less wight on prices in the signal extraction process (that is,  increases):
when  = 1, the two e¤ects cancel out, and overall  = 2v remains constant. An
aggregate non-informational shock (for example, from supply or noise traders) does not
create room for sentiments to propagate on prices.
2. Changes in uncertainty from informational noise, instead, a¤ect prices both through
the informational component and the sentiments channel. In this case, in fact, the
reduction of precision in exogenous information increases the Bayesian weight on prices,
thus making room for sentiments to a¤ect prices.
These results already highlight the di¤erence in scope between informational and non-
informational noise in a¤ecting sentiments, though they refer to the special case of unitary
elasticity of sentiments to uncertainty. In general, with  6= 1, things are less straightforward
and require a bit more analysis.
3.2 Non-informational uncertainty
I start rst by considering non-informational noise: in particular, I will analyze how changes
in uncertainty coming from this component a¤ect the sentiments channel. Such feature is
captured by d
d2"
from (13). Clearly, two elements determine the sign of such derivative:
whether  7 1, and the sign of d
d2"
. This last component captures the e¤ect of a change in
the amount of non-informational noise on the Bayesian weight on private information and it
can be decomposed as
d
d2"
=

2p
2p
2"
:
The rst term is always positive, as it represents the change in the weight on private infor-
mation from an increase in the variance of public information (prices):

2p
=
2v 
2v + 
2
p
2 :
The second term represents the change in the variance of prices from an increase in the
variance of fundamental, non-informational noise: it is also always positive, as it can be
checked numerically. Since it is not possible to derive an explicit and tractable solution for
2p, one can use the implicit function theorem to derive
2p
2"
=  
f=2"
f=2p
; (15)
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where, from (11),
f  2p  

2v + 
2
p
2p
2
2"   
2( 1)
 
2v
2
2s: (16)
The numerator in (15) is always negative, since
f
2"
=  

2v + 
2
p
2p
2
:
The denominator is given by
f
2p
= 1 + 2
 
2v + 
2
p

2v
2
" 
2p
3   2(   1) (2v)
2+1
2s
 
2p
2 3 
2v + 
2
p
2 1 : (17)
First, if   1, all three terms in (17) are positive and clearly f
2p
> 0: This covers the
cases where sentiments respond proportionally or less than proportionally to uncertainty.
Also, with no sentiments, i.e., for 2s = 0, the last term in (17) becomes zero and the
remaining terms are both positive, so again f
2p
> 0.
For the case with  > 1 and 2s > 0, instead, the sign of the expression in (17) is more
di¢cult to establish analytically, since the last term is negative. From a supercial look at
the expression, it might seem that there could be parameterizations for which the third term
in (17) dominates the other two and the whole expression becomes negative, which would
imply that
2p
2"
< 0. This, though, is not the case. To properly assess whether f
2p
> 0, one
needs to numerically solve (11) for 2p and substitute the solution value into (17): numerical
results show that, for any sensible parameterization (i.e., for 2v; 
2
"; 
2
s;  > 0),
f
2p
> 0. To
this end, it can be useful to rewrite (17) as
f
2p
= 1 + 2 (1  )

1 + 

2"
2p
2
  1

: (18)
Fig. (2) shows the value of this expression for di¤erent values of , from 0:01 to 5, xing
2v; 
2
"; 
2
s (these are all xed equal to one in the picture, but similar results hold for any
sensible values of these parameters).
Having established that f
2p
> 0 and f
2"
< 0, it follows that
2p
2"
> 0: an increase in
the volatility of the fundamental shock always increases the volatility of prices. This makes
intuitive sense, as an increase in the exogenous noise in prices is bound to increase their
volatility; moreover, as said above, the result is easily proved if there are no sentiments, and
there is no reason to expect that an additional sentiment component would reverse the e¤ect.
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Figure 2: Values of f
2p
for di¤erent values of , with (2v; 
2
"; 
2
s) = (1; 1; 1).
This result, in turn, together with the fact that 
2p
> 0, implies that d
d2"
> 0 in (13), which
then implies that d
d2"
is negative if  < 1. An increase in non-informational uncertainty can
reduce the sentiments channel, thus dampening the e¤ect of sentiments on prices.
Proposition 1 For  < 1, d
d2"
< 0: when the elasticity of sentiments to uncertainty is
less than one, an increase in the amount of fundamental uncertainty dampens the impact of
sentiments on prices. For  = 1, d
d2"
= 0: when such elasticity is equal to one, the e¤ect
of sentiments on prices does not depend on the amount of fundamental uncertainty in the
market. For  > 1, d
d2"
> 0: when the elasticity is greater than one, an increase in the
amount of fundamental uncertainty increases the e¤ect of sentiments on prices.
For example, for  = 0:5 sentiments grow with the square root of uncertainty: in this case,
an increase in non-informational uncertainty decreases the impact of psychological shocks on
prices.
It must be noted that the price volatility still increases with 2", but the impact of
sentiments on prices decreases. A larger 2" increases the variance of prices but not that
of exogenous information, causing the Bayesian weight on prices to decrease. At the same
time, the increased overall uncertainty allows for stronger sentiments, modulated by . If
 < 1, the amplication of uncertainty in the sentiments channel is restrained, so the net
e¤ect from, on one side, amplied sentiments from greater uncertainty and, on the other side,
reduced role of prices (and thus sentiments) as Bayesian signal, leads to an overall reduction
in the impact of sentiments on prices.
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3.3 Informational uncertainty
The other source of uncertainty in the model, from the private signal, gives rise to informa-
tional uncertainty and its e¤ect on the sentiments channel is captured by the derivative d
d2v
from 14. There are two terms in the expression: while the second one is always positive, the
sign of the rst term depends on whether  ? 1 and on the sign of d
d2v
. This last element
represents the e¤ect of a change in the amount of informational noise on the Bayesian weight
on private information and it can be decomposed into
d
d2v
=

2v
+

2p
2p
2v
: (19)
The rst term represents the direct e¤ect, and it is always negative:

2v
=
 2p 
2v + 
2
p
2 :
The second part represents the indirect e¤ect through the variance of prices and its sign
depends on the combined e¤ect of 
2p
, which is positive (established above), and
2p
2v
:
2p
2v
=  
f=2v
f=2p
:
It was already established before that f=2p > 0. As for the numerator,
f
2v
=  2
2"
2p
  22s
2( 1)
 
2v
2 
  
   1
2v + 
2
p

:
this is clearly always negative, and therefore
2p
2v
> 0 and 
2p
2p
2v
> 0.
From (19), thus, the sign of d
d2v
depends on which of the two e¤ects of 2v on  prevail,
the negative direct one (from the decrease in the precision of private information, 
2v
< 0)
or the positive indirect one (as the increase in noise in exogenous information also increases
the volatility of prices, 
2p
2p
2v
> 0). As the direct e¤ect of 2v on  necessarily dominates the
indirect e¤ect through 2p, the whole term
d
d2v
< 0. This result is conrmed numerically, and
supports the intuition that a decrease in the precision of private information should reduce
the Bayesian weight on such signal.
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Finally, from (14):
d
d2v
= (   1) 2
 
2v
 d
d2v
+  1
 
2v
 1
:
Numerical results show that d
d2v
is always positive: it is clearly the case for  < 1, as then
both terms are positive; but even for  > 1, the (positive) second term always prevails on
the (negative) rst one. An increase in informational noise always amplies the sentiments
channel, enhancing the e¤ect of psychological shocks on prices.
Proposition 2 Irrespective of the elasticity of sentiments to uncertainty, an increase in the
amount of informational uncertainty always increases the impact of psychological shocks on
prices.
Informational uncertainty, thus, di¤ers considerably from non-informational uncertainty
when it comes to sentiments and their impact on prices. Informational uncertainty always
creates space for sentiments to impact on prices, as it simultaneously increases both overall
uncertainty and the Bayesian weight on prices, reinforcing the endogenous transmission from
sentiments to prices.
3.4 Discussion
In a setting where uncertainty amplies sentiments, informational and non-informational
noise can have di¤erent e¤ects on the impact of psychological shocks on prices. In particular,
when the elasticity of sentiments to uncertainty is less than one, non-informational noise
dampens the impact of sentiments on prices, contrary to what one might expect.
Fig. (3) shows the value of the sentiments channel, , for three di¤erent values of ,
smaller, equal and greater than one, as a function of fundamental noise (2") and informational
noise (2v). The graphs visually conrm results derived above: larger informational noise
always increases , irrespective of the value of ; non-informational noise, instead, has
di¤erential e¤ects on  depending on the value of :  decreases with 2" for  < 1, it is
constant for  = 1, and it increases with 2" for  > 1.
The nding that the volatility of the fundamental shock has a negative relation with the
sentiments channel for  < 1 implies that, for example, an increase in noise trading can
actually reduce the relevance of psychological attitudes in stock markets. As prices become
more volatile from increased noise trading, rational agents rely less on prices as an indicator
for the value of an asset, dampening the e¤ect of sentiments on those prices. The overall
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Figure 3: Relationship between uncertainty and  for di¤erent values of  and di¤erent
sources of noise. All other variances set equal to one.
variance of prices still increases, but the part of such variance attributable to sentiments
decreases. There is thus a substitution between fundamental noise and sentiments noise in
prices.
4 Concluding remarks
What is the best way to model sentiments in an economy? In this paper, I propose a
framework that retains the exogeneity of psychological shocks (similar to sunspots) but links
the e¤ect of such shocks on the market to the uncertainty coming from imperfect information.
This modelling choice allows the e¤ect of sentiments to be endogenous, though the shock
that sparks them is exogenous. It captures the intuitive feature that only in the presence
of uncertainty can agents entertain subjective beliefs on economic variables that include
psychological elements not based on information, i.e., sentiments, or animal spirits.
The ensuing sentiments channel, the mechanism through which psychological attitudes
a¤ect stock prices, displays a non-trivial relationship with the level of uncertainty in the
market when agents are Bayesian and use prices as a source of information. An increase
in noise can amplify or dampen the impact of exogenous psychological shocks on prices
depending on the nature of the shock, whether fundamental or informational, and on the
elasticity of sentiments to uncertainty, whether larger or smaller than one. These ndings
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imply that periods of high uncertainty are not necessarily periods of high animal spirits on
nancial markets. It is instead important to identify the source of uncertainty in order to
be able to understand its interaction with psychological attitudes.
An important advantage of the proposed modelling strategy, compared to other ways
of representing sentiments, is that it generates a direct link between uncertainty and the
e¤ect of psychological attitudes on economic outcomes. In a dynamic setting with time-
varying uncertainty, this could generate waves of optimism or pessimism, which, sparked
by exogenous shocks, propagate endogenously through changes in information accuracy over
time.
I leave it for future work to embed such mechanism in more fully edged macroeconomic
and nancial models. While this work only considers sentiments in a nancial market,
the same modelling strategy can be employed to capture sentiments in any market where
the uncertainty of agents estimates (about, e.g., future demand, productivity or any other
element of the economy) creates room for psychological attitudes to a¤ect beliefs.
5 Appendix
5.1 Risk averse agents
I derive here the equivalent of the pricing equation (9) for risk averse agents. It will be shown
that the sentiments channel is the same as the one derived in the model with risk neutral
agents presented in the main text.
If agents preferences are represented by a CARA utility function and all shocks are
normally distributed (see [Hellwig (1980)] for a derivation), one gets that the demand for
shares for the generic agent i is given by
ki =
^
i
  p
2T
;
where  is the coe¢cient of risk aversion and
2T  V ar

^
i

= 2I +
 
2I
2
2s
represents the total error variance.
Aggregating across agents and assuming a stochastic supply "  N (0; 2") gives the
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market equilibrium condition Z
i
kidi = "
 (   p) + (2I)

s
2T
= "
and thus the pricing equation
p =     12T "+ 
 1
 
2I

s: (20)
It can be seen that the pricing equation (20) is of the same form as (9). In particular, the
sentiments channel,  1 (2I)

, is exactly the same as the one derived for risk-neutral agents,
so all the analysis pertaining to this element carries through to a setting with risk averse
agents.
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